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Abstract
In this thesis, we carry out a revealed preference analysis on a class of solutions
to simple allocation problems. We adapt two di¤erent models of decision making into
the simple allocation problems literature. We introduce and characterize the Limited
Consideration Choice Model. In this model, a constraint function generated from the
characteristic vector narrows down the feasible alternatives by forming the consideration
set. The intuition behind this model is that the decision maker is not aware of all
feasible alternatives and a reference point can change the choice of the decision maker.
We next dene some consistency and fairness properties over the constraint function
and analyze their implications over the Limited Consideration Choice Models. We next
introduce and characterize an Aspiration Based Choice Model. In this model, a distance
minimization procedure between the aspiration point that is endogenously determined
within the model and the feasible set of alternatives is used. The intuition behind this
model is capturing the notion of resemblance in the mind of the decision maker using a
subjective distance function. We prove that using the P-norm metric as in the Yu family
used in the bargaining literature with p > 1 within this model gives the Constrained
Equal Losses Rule.
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BAS·IT DA¼GITIM PROBLEMLER·INDE KISITLI DE¼GERLEND·IRME
VE ES·INLENME TEMELL·I KARAR VERME
Ekin Çal¬c¬
Ekonomi Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2016
Tez Dan¬¸sman¬: Özgür K¬br¬s
Anahtar Kelimeler : Aç¬klanan Tercih; Rasyonel; Basit Da¼g¬t¬m Problemleri;
Referansa ba¼gl¬l¬k; De¼gerlendirme; Esinlenme.
Özet
Bu tezde, basit da¼g¬t¬m problemlerinin bir çözüm kurallar¬s¬n¬f¬üzerinde aç¬klanan
tercih analizi uygulad¬k. ·Iki farkl¬karar verme modelini basit da¼g¬t¬m problemleri lit-
eratürüne adapte ettik. Brinci olarak, K¬s¬tl¬De¼gerlendirme Seçim Modelini sunduk ve
karakterize ettik. Bu modelde, karakteristik vektörün bir fonksiyonu olan k¬s¬t fonksiy-
onu, de¼gerlendirme kümesini olus¸turarak, ulas¸¬labilir alternatier kümesini küçültür.
Bu modelin temelini olus¸turan düs¸ünce sistemi, karar vericinin tüm ulas¸¬labilir alternat-
ierinin fark¬nda olmad¬¼g¬ve bir referans noktas¬n¬n onun seçimlerini de¼gi¸stirebilece¼gi
varsay¬mlar¬na dayal¬d¬r. Daha sonra K¬s¬tl¬De¼gerlendirme Modeli içinde tutarl¬l¬k ve
adillik analizleri yapabilmek için k¬s¬t fonsiyonlar¬üzerinde birtak¬m özellikler tan¬m-
lad¬k. ·Ikinci olarak Esinlenme Temelli Seçim Modelini sunduk ve karakterize ettik.
Bu modelde, endojen biçimde modelin içinde belirlenen esinlenme noktas¬ile ulas¸¬la-
bilir alternatier aras¬ndaki mesafeyi minimize etme prosedürü kullan¬l¬r. Bu modelin
temelini olus¸turan düs¸ünce sistemi, subjektif bir mesafe fonksiyonu kullanarak, karar
vericinin zihnindeki benzerlik nosyonunu yakalamakt¬r. Bu modelde p > 1 sa¼glan¬rken
P-norm metriklerinin kullan¬m¬n¬n K¬s¬tland¬r¬lm¬¸s Es¸it Kay¬plar Kural¬n¬verece¼gini ve
bu modelin pazarl¬k problemleri literatüründeki p > 1 parametresine göre Yu çözüm
ailesine kar¸s¬l¬k gelece¼gini kan¬tlad¬k.
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1 Introduction
Revealed preference theory is based on the idea that the preferences of consumers can
be revealed by analysis of observable data on choice behavior. The rst description
of the concept was by Samuelson (1938). It was followed by an enormous amount of
studies departing from the extensions and the renements of the original idea. The
main concern of the theory was to describe the economical environment where the
observable data on the choice are consistent with the utility maximization behavior,
and to understand the conditions and situations under which one can forecast or reveal
additional information on the demand. The concept became one of the most inuential
idea of the economics.
Revealing information about preferences departing from the choice is applicable to
a wide range of choice situations. On the application of the theory to bargaining games,
Nash (1950) worked on the bargaining rules that can be said rational in the sense that
they are maximizers of an underlying preferences of an impartial arbitrator. Revealed
preference literature also focuses on group preferences and group choices motivated by
social choice considerations or game-theoretic considerations.
We follow a revealed preference approach on a class of solutions to simple allocation
problems. We are interested in the following simple allocation problem. A social en-
dowment of E is to be allocated among N agents. Each agent i has his characteristic
value ci. A social endowment E can be interpreted as a divisible commodity to be di-
vided between the members of the society. Each agent is characterized by ci amount of
that commodity. Simple allocation problems applies to many economic models. They
can be interpreted di¤erently according to the related eld. Under permit alloca-
tion literature, we consider the situation where The Environment Protection Agency
is to allocate E amount of pollution permits to the N many rms. Each rm i has
an emission constraint ci depending on its location as directed by local authorities. In
the study of the single peaked or saturated preferences, there is a social planner
in charge of allocating E units of a perfectly divisible commodity among members of
N . In this case, each agent i have preferences with saturation point ci. The rest of
the preference information is disregarded. In taxation, a simple allocation problem
of the public authority that collects E amount of tax from the society of N agents is
considered. In this framework, ci indicates the income level of agent i. This problem
is very well-known and basic in public nance. A simple allocation problem can be
adopted to the demand rationing problem where a supplier is to allocate its total
amount of production E among the N demanders. Each demander i demands ci units
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of the commodity. This problem is analyzed in detail in the context of supply-chain
management literature. Bargaining with quasi linear preferences and claims
can be interpreted as an arbitrator in charge of allocating E units of a numeraire good
among the agents that have quasi linear preferences. Each agent i has a claim ci that
he wants to receive. Surplus sharing problems can be analyzed as a simple allocation
problem. A social planner is to allocate the return of a project between the N many
investors. The size of the return is E: Each of the investors is dened by their invested
amount si. The total return of the company equals or is bigger than the total invested
amount by investor. The project is protable. In this case ci = E  
P
Nnfig
sj is dened
as the maximal share of the agent i. Note that
P
N
ci = E. A consumer choice under
xed prices and rationing is another possible application eld. A consumer has to
allocate his income E among a set of N many commodities. In this case the prices are
xed. There are also rationing constraints on how much the consumer can consume
of each commodity as in the xed-price literature. The agent faces a consumption
constraint ci on commodity i.
We emphasize the application to bankruptcy problems where a bankruptcy judge
decides how to allocate the remaining liquidation value of the bankrupt rm among its
N many creditors. Each creditor claims his credited value. We interpret an allocation
rule as a positive construct representing the choices of a decision maker or a bankruptcy
judge. We take K¬br¬s (2012, 2013) as a framework on the analysis of the conditions
under which the bankruptcy judges decisions are rational. The rationality concept is
stated as the existence of a binary relation B  RN+  RN+ such that maximizers of
the binary relation are the same as the allocation rules choices for each bankruptcy
problem. An allocation rule F is rational if and only if it satises a standard property
called WARP (The Weak Axiom of Revealed Preferences) or equivalently contraction
independence. Furthermore, on the paper it was proved that almost every member of
the best-known allocation rules family such as the Proportional rule, the Equal Losses
rule and the Talmud rule violates contraction independence hence they are not rational
in the framework of the standard theory with the exception of the Equal Gains rule. In
the light of the facts mentioned above, the rules that are commonly used in practice or
had an important place in the literature as well-known examples can not be rationalized
by standard revealed preference theory.
To be able to deal with this problem, we extend the basic setup of the standard
revealed preference analysis on solutions to simple allocation problems. We propose to
adapt two di¤erent models of decision making process into the existing literature.
Our rst model is an adaptation of the Limited Attention and Status Quo Bias
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Choice Theory (Dean et al (2014)) from behavioral choice literature. The central con-
cept is that a decision maker can not evaluate all feasible alternatives and only considers
a limited subset of the alternatives. Additionally, a status quo can change the decision
between non status quo alternatives.
Our rst model incorporates this idea by constructing a mapping showing the alloca-
tions that are considered by the decision maker. In contrast to other decision models in
hand, our consideration set is a function of the characteristic vector. Then the decision
maker selects the allocation that maximizes a strictly monotone preference relation
among the feasible alternatives that are in the consideration set.
Theorem 3 states that any allocation rule F can be rationalized with Limited Con-
sideration Model. Proposition 5 states that if an allocation rule F is consistent with
Limited Consideration Model and its constraint function satises a property that we
dened as consistency, then it is rational. We observe that the constraint function that
is consistent with Equal Losses, Equal Gains, Serial Dictatorship and Proportional Rule
satises the property of Equal Treatment of Equals. We dene a fairness criteria to
order the Limited Consideration Choice Models with the constraint functions that are
consistent to some well-known allocation rules in that sense. Proposition 9 states that
the constraint function that is consistent to Proportional rule constitutes the most fair
limited consideration model according to our scale and it is followed by the model con-
sisting of the constraint function that is consistent with Equal Gains, Equal Losses and
Serial Dictatorship allocation rules given respectively to the order.
Our second model is an adaptation of Aspiration-based choice theory (Güney et
al (2011)) from the choice theory literature and the concept of Social compromises
(Yu (1973), Conley et al (2000), Pnsgsten et al (2003)) from the bargaining solutions
literature. The main idea behind the Aspiration-based choice theory is that decision
makers are in an environment such that a possibly unattainable aspiration alternative
inuences their decisions. A choice problem in this setting is a pair (S; Y ) where S 
Y  X with S being the set of actual alternatives that are available to choose, Y being
the potential set of alternatives that can include unavailable alternatives. The grand
set of alternatives is X. The decision maker observes the potential set of alternatives
but he needs to choose an alternative from the actual set of alternatives. There is a
possibly unavailable aspiration point chosen from the set Y . In the decision making
process, the decision maker maximizes his preference relation over the potential set of
alternatives to form the aspiration alternative. Then the decision maker selects the
closest alternative in the actual set of alternatives to the his aspiration point. The
closeness is determined by a subjective and endogenous distance function.
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Similarly, there is an analogous decision process behind the concept of Social com-
promises in the bargaining solutions. In bargaining problems, agents can obtain any
of the alternatives in the feasible set. They have di¤erent preferences over the feasible
alternatives. If they come to an agreement on a particular alternative, that is what they
get. If there is no agreement, they end up at the disagreement point that is a prespec-
ied feasible alternative. In this context, there is an utopic ideal point that bargaining
parties ideally wants to achieve. The ideal point acts like a reference point. The main
idea is having a decision rule that selects the closest point to the unachievable reference
point among all feasible alternatives. In that sense, bargaining parties minimize their
compromises by decreasing the di¤erence between what they actually want and what
they get.
In our case, we try to adapt social compromises or aspiration based choice models
into the simple allocation problems literature. We model an environment in which
the characteristic vector acts like an aspiration or a reference point that inuences the
decision process. The selection of the claim vector as a reference point is based on the
idea of a decision maker maximizing a strictly monotone preference relation over grand
set of alternatives. The grand set of alternatives consists of the allocations such that
every agent receives less than or equal to their characteristic value. The decision maker
selects the closest allocation to the characteristic vector among the feasible alternatives
according to a subjective distance function which captures the notion of resemblance
in his mind.
Theorem 11 states that the Equal Losses rule is consistent with Aspiration Based
Choice model and Yu solutions from bargaining literature with P-norm metric such
that p > 1 gives Equal Losses allocation rule in our domain.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide a review of the
literature. In section 3, we provide the general framework of revealed preference analysis
on simple allocation problems. We refer to K¬br¬s (2012) for reminding the properties
of rational rules and restate the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for rationality. We
provide the general forms of the well-known allocation rules from the literature. In
section 4, we introduce our Limited Consideration Choice Model. We present our main
characterization result. We impose some properties over constraint function and analyze
the constraint function that are consistent with some well known allocation rules that
behaves accordingly to our properties. In section 5, we introduce our Aspiration Based
Choice Model. We provide the general framework. Finally, we conclude in Section 6.
4
2 Literature Review
The revealed preference notion has been introduced by Samuelson (1938). The as-
sumption of the gathering information about preferences based on the choices has been
applied in a wide range of the choice situations. Early works on this eld aim to
characterize the demand and forecast the chosen consumption bundles in any possi-
ble budget set using revealed preference analysis on theoretical framework (Samuelson
(1953), Yokoyama (1953), Newman (1960)). In the empirical eld Koo (1963) used
household data to nd what can be called rational behavior, Miller (2002) used public
good experiments under the same objective. The purpose was characterizing data sets
that ts the idea of decision makers maximizing preferences.
Following the main idea behind the revealed preferences theory, Houthakker (1950)
tried to nd the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the existence of a utility function
that represents well-behaved preferences. The utility function should also be compatible
with the choice behavior of the decision maker. The aim here was to generalize the
law of demand. Strong axiom of revealed preference stated by Houthakker provides
the possibility of testing the data set to see if it is consistent with the theory of the
consumer. Cherno¤ (1954) and Sen (1969) characterized the axiom of independence of
irrelevant alternatives on choice rules in the context of individual choice. A choice rule
satises this axiom if an option chosen from a set for a decision problem is also chosen
from decision problems with the subsets of that original problem. Richter (1966) focused
on the conditions that are necessary for the rationality of a consumer. These axioms
dened the conditions under which standard economic theory can identify preferences in
the mind of the decision maker by looking at the choice behavior of that agent. Varian
(2005, 2006) provided a detailed survey on revealed preference theory and analyzed the
development of the literature. Chambers et al (2010) generalized the classical revealed
preference theory and obtained applications to the theory of group preferences and
Nash equilibrium. This concept applies to a vast range of choice situations.
Simple allocation problems literature is devoted to nding a fair way to divide a
certain amount of value or asset among its claimants. Each claimant has a nonnegative
claim over remaining asset. The remaining value is insu¢ cient to satisfy all the claims.
Bankruptcy problems are one of the application eld of this sort of simple allocation
problems. This literature was originated in a fundamental paper by ONeill (1982). The
objective of ONeill was nding applicable and well-behaved rules that provide some
consistency properties. The purpose was narrowing down the number of the acceptable
division rules departing from the Talmud. Aumann and Maschler (1985) provided a
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game theoretical analysis of bankruptcy problems. They generated a new allocation
rule. Dagan (1996) contributed to the literature by making axiomatic characterization
of the two Talmudic bankruptcy rules. In this characterization, the property of inde-
pendence of irrelevant claims is dened. This axiom requires that an allocation rule
can only be a function of the set of allocations as a characterization of Equal Gains
Rule. K¬br¬s (2012) followed a revealed preference analysis on simple allocation prob-
lems. The purpose was nding the necessary conditions to have decision makers with
rational and representable choice rules. Rationality of an allocation rule was dened
with the existence of a binary relation which has a unique maximizer over its sets of
feasible allocations that coincides with the chosen option by the allocation rule. To
reach this goal, the axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives was applied on
allocation rules in the domain of simple allocation problems.
In this thesis, to widen the scope of the analysis of revealed preference theory on
simple allocation problems and surpass the problem of rationality of allocation rules, we
incorporate two di¤erent models of decision making from choice theory and bargaining
problems literature into the our framework.
Our rst decision making model is based on the idea that the decision maker can
su¤er from limited consideration and a reference point among the alternatives can
a¤ect and perturb his choice between other alternatives. Masatl¬o¼glu and Ok (2005)
analyzed the presence of the status quo bias. In their model a status quo option could
change the choices among non status quo options. Masatl¬o¼glu and Uler (2013) studied
the environments that creates the reference e¤ect and its inuences over the choice
of decision maker when they are not chosen. Rubinstein and Salant (2006) set up a
choice model in which an ordering over feasible alternatives determines a reference
point within the model. The reference point inuence the choice by perturbing the
preferences. Choice overload and decision avoidance concepts are studied by Tversky
and Shar (1992), Dean (2009) and Buturak and Evren (2014). Masatl¬o¼glu et al (2010)
provided a model with consumer unawareness that overlooks some options and has a
limited consideration set. Masatl¬o¼glu and Nakajima (2013) utilized the concept of
consideration sets and analyzed the behavioral search. Dean et al (2014) combined the
idea of the limited attention and status quo bias in a model with an attention set and
a psychological constraint function. The attention set restricts the options that are
considered by decision maker. The psychological constraint function is formed by the
status quo option that can a¤ect the choice among feasible alternatives.
In contrast of these models, our model considers a reference dependent constraint
function. That is, reference point can change the choice between other alternatives and
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at the same time limits the attention of the decision maker by narrowing down the
considered alternatives.
Our second decision making model proposes a process formed by a distance mini-
mization procedure, in contrast to standard theory. The concerned distance is between
an endogenously determined reference or aspiration point and the feasible alternatives.
In social choice theory, the notion of social compromises was introduced into several
di¤erent areas. This concept constitutes the decision rules selecting closest feasible al-
ternatives to an unattainable ideal point among all alternatives according to a suitable
metric or quasi-metric. A social rule satisfy metric rationalizability when the options
selected by social choice rule coincide with the options selected with social compro-
mise model. Stehling(1978), Farkas and Nitzan (1979) and Baigent (1987) followed this
approach on Arrovian social welfare functions. Nitzan (1981) analyzed metric rational-
ization of social choice correspondences.
In choice theory literature, Rubinstein and Zhou (1999) proposed a model where the
decision rule selects the alternative which minimizes the Euclidean distance between
the feasible alternatives and an exogenously given reference point. Güney et al (2011)
constructed a model with an environment in which a minimization procedure is used.
The process used to nd the closest feasible alternative to a possibly unfeasible aspira-
tion point. In this model, the aspiration point was determined by the maximization of
a single preference relation over grand set of alternatives. The closeness was determined
according to an endogenous and subjective distance function. The idea behind the use
of the subjective distance function was capturing the notion of resemblance that is in
the mind of decision maker.
Bargaining problems literature investigates the possible and fair ways of sharing
the gains from the cooperation among an N person society. Every member of society
tries to maximize their own utility within a set of possible payo¤s. There exists an ex-
ogenously given disagreement point. The rst formal treatment of bargaining problems
eld was made by Nash (1950). Yu (1973) proposed an alternative approach to bargain-
ing problems. In this study, P-norm distance functions were used to nd the selected
feasible point that minimize the distance between the ideal point and the achievable
points that are available to choose by decision process. Conley et al (2000) made char-
acterization of the symmetric and weighted versions of Euclidean compromise solutions
for multiobjective optimization problems. Pngsten and Waganer (2004) constructed
the general framework of the social compromises in the bargaining solution literature.
They explored and specied some distance functions corresponding to the well-known
bargaining solutions. The analysis of the necessary conditions that provide the metric
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rationalizability of bargaining solutions was also made.
3 Simple Allocation Problems
Let N = f1; :::; ng be the set of agents. For i 2 N , let ei be the ith unit vector in
RN+ . We use the vector inequalities 5, , <. For each E 2 R+ , let 4 (E) = fx
2 RN+ j
P
N
xi = Eg:
A simple allocation problem for a society of N is a pair (c; E) 2 RN+  R+ such
that
P
N
ci = E where E represents the endowment level and c represents characteristic
vector. Let C be the set of all simple allocation problems for N . Given a simple
allocation problem (c; E) 2 C, let X (c; E) = fx 2 RN+ j x 5 c and
P
N
xi 5 Eg be the
choice set of (c; E).
An allocation rule F : C ! RN+ assigns each simple allocation problem (c; E) to an
allocation F (c; E) 2 X (c; E) such that P
N
Fi (c; E) = E. For every allocation rule F ,
F (c; E) 5 c has to hold by construction of the choice set. Additionally,
P
N
Fi (c; E) = E
can be interpreted as an e¢ ciency property.
The Proportional rule allocates the endowment proportional to the characteristic
values: for each i 2 N ,
PROi (c; E) =
ciP
N cj
E:
The Equal Gains rule (Constrained equal awards rule) allocates the endowment
equally, subject to no agent receiving more than its characteristic value: for each i 2 N
,
EGi (c; E) = minfci; gwhere 2 R+satisfies
P
N
minfci; g = E:
The Equal Losses rule (Constrained equal losses) equalizes the losses agents incur,
subject to no agent receiving a negative share; for each i 2 N ,
ELi (c; E) = maxf0; ci   gwhere 2 R+satisfies
X
N
maxf0; ci   g = E:
The Serial Dictatorship rule allocates the endowment to the agent with highest
priority until he receives his characteristic value and than repeat the same process for
each agent following the priority order over agents.
For every rule F , we construct an induced revealed preference relation, RF  RN+ 
RN+ , as follows: for each x; y 2 RN+ , xRFy if and only if there is (c; E) 2 C such that
x = F (c; E) and y 2 X (c; E). The strict revealed preference relation induced by F ,
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P F , is dened as xP Fy if and only if xRFy and x 6= y.
A rule F satises WARP (the weak axiom of revealed preferences) if and only
if it is rational. WARP can be stated as follows: for each pair (c; E) ; (c0; E) 2 C,
F (c; E) 2 X (c0; E) and F (c; E) 6= F (c0; E) implies F (c0; E) =2 X (c; E). So that
WARP is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for rationality on our domain as in the
standard revealed preferences theory. Another well-known property from revealed pref-
erence theory is contraction independence. This property is also referred to as inde-
pendence of irrelevant alternatives (Nash (1950)) or Sens property  (Sen (1971)).
Contraction independence can be stated as follows: for each pair (c; E) ; (c0; E) 2 C,
F (c; E) 2 X (c0; E)  X (c; E) implies F (c0; E) = F (c; E). A rule F satises contrac-
tion independence if and only if it satises WARP. This equivalence provides a simple
way of checking whether an allocation rule satises WARP.
4 Limited Consideration
4.1 Model
In what follows, we keep using the preliminaries and notations coming from base model
constructed by K¬br¬s(2012).
The limited consideration model consists of two elements - a preference relation and
a constraint function.
The constraint function is used to nd out the options that decision maker is pre-
pared to take into consideration among all possible alternatives. It is a function of
the characteristic vector. The characteristic vector represents the reference point in
our model. It shows its impact on choice through the channel of attention. In every
choice problem (c; E) 2 C, the decision maker is aware of the characteristic vector. The
constraint function captures the fact that a reference point could inuence the decision
makers choice by eliminating some options from consideration. It is based on the idea
that characteristic vector as a reference point do matter for the decision maker and
it can rule out some options out of consideration. The constraint function assigns to
every possible characteristic vector c 2 RN+ to a consideration set. The consideration
set is a subset of possible allocations such that every agent receives less than or equal
to his characteristic value. The consideration set represents the set of alternatives that
the decision maker is aware of under reference point c.
Denition 1 A constraint function is a mapping Q : RN+ ! RN+ such that 8c 2 RN+
and 8x 2 Q (c) we have x 5 c.
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The preference relation is used to represent the tastes of the decision maker over
the feasible alternatives. We denote the preference relation by R.
An allocation x is said to be the maximizer of R in X (c; E) if xRy holds for all
y 2 X (c; E).
We interpret the simple allocation problem (c; E) 2 C in the following manner: A
decision maker observes the characteristic vector of the given simple allocation problem.
He then forms his consideration set. The consideration set is formed by his constraint
function that is a function of the reference point. The intersection of the consideration
set and the choice set of (c; E), that is X (c; E), constitutes the feasible allocations
that can be chosen by decision maker under the simple allocation problem (c; E). The
options which are ruled out by constraint function are considered as if they were not
feasible since the decision maker is no longer aware of those options. The decision maker
selects the maximizer of R in Q (c) \ X (c; E) as the solution of the simple allocation
problem (c; E).
Denition 2 An allocation rule F is consistent with Limited Consideration Model if
there exists a preference relation R and a constraint function Q such that 8 (c; E) 2 C,
we have
F (c; E) = argmax
R
(Q (c) \X (c; E))
4.2 Results
In this part, we provide the main characterization of the Limited Consideration Choice
Model. In contrast to standard revealed preference theory, limited consideration choice
model is consistent with any allocation rule F .
Theorem 3 Any allocation rule F can be rationalized with a (Q;R) pair.
Proof. Take any allocation rule F and characteristic vector c.
Take any simple allocation problem (c; E) 2 C.
Construct Q such that Q (c) = fx 2 RN+ j x = F (c; E) for all E such that 0  E P
N cig.
Take R to be represented by the utility function U (x) =
P
N xi.
We need to show that F (c; E) = argmaxR (Q (c) \X (c; E)) for all (c; E) 2 C.
Suppose x = argmaxR (Q (c) \X (c; E)) .
We know that (Q (c) \X (c; E)) is not empty since Q (c) is not empty. For all
x 2 Q (c), there exists E =PN xi such that x = F (c; E) 2 X (c; E).
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Under this construction x 2 (Q (c) \X (c; E)) implies that x = F (c; E 0) for some
level of endowment E 0 such that 0  E 0  E. The maximization process on this set
according to R selects the allocation x such that
P
N xi = E for all (c; E) 2 C since our
preference relation R is strictly monotone.
The chosen allocation corresponds x = F (c; E) for all (c; E) 2 C. Hence we have
x = argmaxR (Q (c) \X (c; E)) = F (c; E) for all (c; E) 2 C.
This theorem shows that Limited Attention Model in simple allocation problems is
not falsiable and any bankruptcy rule can be rationalized by a (Q;R) pair constructed
in suitable manner.
We next dene some properties over the constraint function.
Consistency imposes a restriction over the constraint function in the same way that
the contraction independence restricts the choice behavior.
Denition 4 (Consistency) A constraint function Q is said to satisfy consistency,
if for each pair c; c0 2 RN+ such that c 5 c0, x 2 Q (c0) and x 5 c then x 2 Q (c).
Consistency requires that an option taken into consideration by the decision maker
in a big set of alternatives must be considered in its subsets if it is feasible. The basic
idea is that if an option attracts attention in choice set X (c0; E), then it also attract
attention in subsets of X (c0; E) if it remains attainable under the new simple allocation
problem.
Proposition 5 If an allocation rule F is consistent with the limited consideration
choice model and it has a consistent Q, then it is rational.
Proof. We use the axiom of contraction independence as a su¢ cient and necessary
condition on rationality for this proof.
Suppose we have F (c0; E) 2 X (c; E)  X (c0; E). We need to show that F (c0; E) =
F (c; E). We have c 5 c0 since X (c; E)  X (c0; E) holds.
Under our construction x = F (c0; E) implies that x 2 Q (c0). If x = F (c0; E) 2
X (c; E) is true, then x 5 c holds.
By consistency, 8c; c0 2 RN+ such that c 5 c0, if x 2 Q (c0) and x 5 c holds,
then x 2 Q (c) thus x 2 Q (c). By denition of Q (c) this implies x = F (c; E) for
E =
P
N x

i . Hence x
 = F (c; E) = F (c0; E).
Proposition 5 shows that consistency of a constraint function on the limited consid-
eration model is equivalent to rationality of an allocation rule on standard model on
our domain.
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In what follows, we construct and dene some specic constraint functions that are
consistent with the well-known allocation rules.
We explicitly dene consideration sets of the commonly used allocation rules such
that;
QPRO (c) = fx 2 RN+ j x = PRO (c; E) forallEsuchthat0  E 
X
N
cig
for the Proportional Rule,
QSD (c) = fx 2 RN+ j x = SD (c; E) forallEsuchthat0  E 
X
N
cig
for the Serial Dictatorship Rule,
QEL (c) = fx 2 RN+ j x = EL (c; E) forallEsuchthat0  E 
X
N
cig
for the Equal Losses Rule, and
QEG (c) = fx 2 RN+ j x = EG (c; E) forallEsuchthat0  E 
X
N
cig
for the Equal Gains Rule.
We next dene another desired property on the constraint function.
Equal treatment of equals is a condition on the constraint function to check if it
is well behaved in a normative sense. It is a quite standard notion of fairness in the
literature.
Denition 6 (Equal Treatment of Equals) A constraint function Q is said to sat-
isfy equal treatment of equals, if for every c 2 RN+ such that ci = cj for some i; j 2 N ,
xi = xj holds for all x 2 Q (c).
Consider the consideration sets QPRO, QEL, QEA constructed as described above,
they satisfy Equal Treatment of Equals.
Consider the consideration set QPRO. For all i 2 N , PROi (c; E) = ciP
N cj
E and
PROi (c; E) = PROj (c; E) since ciP
N cj
E = cjP
N cj
E when ci = cj.
Consider the consideration set QEG. For all i 2 N , the constrained equal awards
rule assigns EGi (c; E) = min (ci; ) where  2 R+ satises
P
N min (ci; ) = E and
ci = cj implies min (ci; ) = min (cj; ) thus EGi (c; E) = EGj (c; E).
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Take QEL. For all i 2 N , the constrained equal losses rule assigns ELi (c; E) =
maxf0; ci   g where  2 R+ satises
P
N maxf0; ci   g = E and ci = cj implies
maxf0; ci   g = maxf0; cj   g thus ELi (c; E) = ELj (c; E).
Consider the consideration set QSD. It does not satisfy Equal Treatment of Equals.
Example 7 Take N = 2 and SD (c; E) = f(E; 0) if E  c1 and (c1; E   c1) if c1 <
E PN cig.
Suppose c1 = c2. Under this construction SD1 (c; E) = SD2 (c; E) holds only if
E = c1 + c2.
Equal treatment of equals imposes restrictions on constraint function only if there
are claimants with the same characteristic values.
We construct a new fairness criteria over the limited consideration models to dene
a more general and testable notion of fairness that looks at every allocation that is in
the consideration set. For each agent i, we look at the ratio of xiP
N xj
to ciP
N cj
for every
endowment level E > 0 for a xed characteristic vector. We nd the minimum value
among all agents in the society and all endowment levels under this characteristic vector.
We consider all possible characteristic vector and related allocations within each Limited
Consideration Choice Model. The fairness criteria evaluates each model according to
the possible minimum values under di¤erent characteristic vector combinations. The
basic idea behind this criteria is that the share of an agent from the remaining value
should be as close as to the his share of characteristic vector from the total value of
characteristic value as an indicator of fairness.
Denition 8 Given two limited consideration models (Q1; R1) and (Q2; R2), we say
that the rst model is more fair than the second model, denoted by Q1 > Q2, if R1 = R2
and for all c 2 RN+ , we have
min
x2Q1(c)
x>0
i2N
xiP
N xj
ciP
N cj
 min
y2Q2(c)
y>0
i2N
yiP
N yj
ciP
N cj
and there exists an c 2 RN+ such that
min
x2Q1(c)
x>0
i2N
xiP
N xj
ciP
N cj
> min
y2Q2(c)
y>0
i2N
yiP
N yj
ciP
N cj
:
We next give an order for some commonly used allocation rules according to or
fairness criteria.
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Proposition 9 According to our fairness criteria, QPRO > QEG > QEL > QSD.
Proof. Take QPRO. For each i 2 N , PROi (c; E) = ciP
N cj
E. For all i 2 N and for all
c 2 RN+ , we have
xiP
N xj
ciP
N cj
=
ciP
N cj
EP
N xj
ciP
N cj
=
ciP
N cj
E
E
ciP
N cj
=
ciP
N cj
ciP
N cj
= 1 (1)
Thus
min
x2QPRO(c)
x>0
i2N
xiP
N xj
ciP
N cj
= 1. (2)
Take QSD.Suppose ith person in the society has the highest priority. Take j 2 N
such that j 6= i. For all E such that E  ci we have SDj (c; E) = 0.
Thus
min
x2QSD(c)
x>0
i2N
xiP
N xj
ciP
N cj
=
0
E
ciP
N cj
= 0. (3)
Take QEL. For each i 2 N , ELi (c; E) = maxf0; ci   g where  2 R+ satisesP
N maxf0; ci   g = E. Take c 2 RN+ such that ci = c for all i 2 N . In this case
8i 2 N , ELi (c; E) = ci    = EN since N (ci   ) = E. In this case for each i 2 N , we
have
xiP
N xj
ciP
N cj
=
E
N
E
ciP
N cj
=
1
N
ci
Nci
=
1
N
1
N
= 1. (4)
Take c 2 RN+ such that ci = c for all i 2 N does not hold. Take the person with the
lowest characteristic value. Say it is the ith person in the society. For Equal Losses rule,
ELi (c; E) = 0 when   ci where
P
N maxf0; ci g = E. Under this allocation rule, 
is determined with
P
N cj  N = E so  =
P
N cj E
N
. This implies that if
P
N cj E
N
 ci
then ELi (c; E) = 0. For all E such that E 
P
N cj Nci we have xi = ELi (c; E) = 0.
Thus for all c 2 RN+ such that ci = c for all i 2 N we have
min
x2QEL(c)
x>0
i2N
xiP
N xj
ciP
N cj
= 1 (5)
and otherwise we have
min
x2QEL(c)
x>0
i2N
xiP
N xj
ciP
N cj
=
0
E
ciP
N cj
= 0 (6)
:
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Take QEG. For each i 2 N , EGi (c; E) = minfci; g where  2 R+ satisesP
N
minfci; g = E. Take c 2 RN+ such that ci = c for all i 2 N . In this case 8i 2 N ,
EGi (c; E) =
E
N
since N = E. In this case for each i 2 N , we have
xiP
N xj
ciP
N cj
=
E
N
E
ciP
N cj
=
1
N
ci
Nci
=
1
N
1
N
= 1: (7)
Take c 2 RN+ such that ci = c for all i 2 N does not hold. Take the person with the
lowest characteristic value. Say it is the ith person in the society. For all E such that
E
N
< ci we have EGi (c; E) = EN for each i 2 N . Thus
xiP
N xj
ciP
N cj
=
E
N
E
ciP
N cj
=
1
N
:
P
N cj
cj
. (8)
The ratio gets smaller when the share of ci in
P
N cj gets bigger and the number
of agents in the society increases. But it is always bigger than 0 with nite number of
agents.
Thus for all c 2 RN+ such that ci = c for all i 2 N we have
min
x2QEG(c)
x>0
i2N
xiP
N xj
ciP
N cj
= 1 (9)
and otherwise we have
min
x2QEG(c)
x>0
i2N
xiP
N xj
ciP
N cj
> 0 (10)
Hence we have QPRO > QEG > QEL > QSD as a scale of fairness.
5 Aspiration Based Choice Model
5.1 Model
In what follows, we dene a potential set of alternatives, denoted by Y (c) given c 2 RN+ ,
such that Y (c) = fx 2 RN+ j x 5 c and
P
N xi 
P
N cig. The potential set contains
all alternatives that are potentially available to choose. For a given simple allocation
problem (c; E) 2 C, Y (c) nX (c; E) is dened as the set of phantom alternatives in
the model. For a given simple allocation problem (c; E) 2 C, there is no phantom
alternatives at endowment level E =
P
N ci.
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The aspiration based choice model consists of two elements - a continuous metric d
and a linear order R.
The linear order R represents the decision makers tastes over potential set of al-
ternatives. It is used to form the ideal point or aspiration point for a given simple
allocation problem (c; E) 2 C. Given a simple allocation problem, the maximizer of R
in potential set of alternatives is called the aspiration point. The main idea behind the
concept of aspiration point is that an option that is potentially unavailable to choose
can inuence the choice among feasible alternatives even if it is not attainable. Possibly
unavailable aspiration points can inuence and change the decisions.
The continuous metric d : X2 ! R+ is used to capture the notion of resemblance
in the mind of the decision maker via subjective distance functions. It is endogenously
dened. One can say that this metric acts like a psychological distance dener between
di¤erent alternatives.
We interpret the simple allocation problem (c; E) 2 C in the following manner:
When confronted with a simple allocation problem (c; E) 2 C, a decision maker rst
forms his ideal aspiration point according to linear order R. The maximizer of R in
Y (c) is the aspiration point in our model. We represent aspiration point of Y (c) with
a (Y (c)). On the next step, the decision maker uses his subjective metric d for selecting
the closest alternative in X (c; E) to his aspiration point a (Y (c)). The aspiration point
is the unique element in Y (c) that maximizes the decision makers utility. Under the
construction of our model, we can have two decision makers with the same aspiration
point for a given (c; E) 2 C selecting di¤erent alternatives from the choice set ofX (c; E)
since the distance function is determined according to a subjective metric that can
change from decision maker to decision maker. The idea behind this construction is
capturing the notion of resemblance for each decision maker.
Denition 10 An allocation rule F is consistent with the Aspiration Based Choice
Model if there exists a continuous metric d : X2 ! R+ and a continuous linear order
R such that
F (c; E) = arg min
x2X(c;E)
d (a (Y (c)) ; X (c; E))
for all (c; E) 2 C where a (Y (c)) is the maximizer of R in Y (c).
We note that this minimization procedure is well dened since the metric d is con-
tinuous and the domain is compact.
In our model, we impose to have a strictly monotone preference relation R so that
for all (c; E) 2 C, a (Y (c)) = c meaning that the characteristic vector is the ideal point
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for all possible simple allocation problems. This reects the idea that for any given
simple allocation problem, the characteristic vector is the ideal point for all the parties
involved. From now on, we take the preference relation R to be represented with the
utility function U (x) =
P
N xi.
Our model is an adaptation of the Yu solutions family from bargaining literature.
Yu (1983) stated the bargaining problem as follows: There is a group of n persons, each
of them having a utility function dened over a set of alternatives for a decision to be
made by the group. The aim was to nd a solution option such that the group regret
is minimized according to their utility function. P-norm distance function is dened
as: Dp (U (x)) = [
Pn
i=1 (U

i   Ui (x))p]
1
p . The compromise (Yu) solution with respect
to parameter p is stated as the minimizer of Dp (U (x)) in set of feasible alternatives
such that each agent has a nonnegative utility.
5.2 Results
We provide our main theorem under the Aspiration Based Choice Model. We show that
the Aspiration Based Choice Model with P-norm metric such that p > 1 corresponds to
Yu solution family with respect to parameter p > 1 and it gives the Constrained Equal
Losses Rule.
Theorem 11 The constrained equal losses rule is consistent with the aspiration based
choice model and corresponds to Yu solutions family with respect to parameter p > 1.
Proof. Let p > 1. When 0  p < 1, we have a quasi-metric since triangular inequality
is not satised. When p = 1 we could have multiple solutions for a minimization process
and it is not consistent the unique selection of an allocation rule.
Take R represented by U (x) =
P
N xi and form a (Y (c)) = c.
Take continuous metric d = (
P
N (ci   xi)p).
We need to show that
EL (c; E) = arg min
x2X(c;E)
d (c;X (c; E))
for all (c; E) 2 C.
We have constrained optimization process with inequality constraints at the hand
since we search for the closest option to the aspiration point c in X (c; E) so that such
an alternative should satisfy 0 5 x 5 c and
P
N xi  E. We state the Kuhn-Tucker
su¢ cient conditions for a minimum and we maximize the negative of the distance
function to do a minimization since this is a maximum only problem.
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Our maximization problem is dened as;
min
x2X(c;E)
d (c;X (c; E)) = max
x2X(c;E)
 d (c;X (c; E)) = max
x2X(c;E)
 
 X
N
(ci   xi)p
! 1
p
(11)
subject to X
N
xi  E; (12)
xi  08i 2 N (13)
and
xi  ci8i 2 N: (14)
We have the Lagrangian function:
L (xi; ; i)= 
 X
N
(ci   xi)p
! 1
p
+ 
 
E  
X
N
xi
!
+
X
N
i (ci   xi) (15)
We state Kuhn-Tucker conditions as:
Lxi =
1
p
 X
N
(ci   xi)p
! 1 p
p
:p: (ci   xi)p 1     i  0 (16)
for all i 2 N
X
N
xi  E (17)
xi  ci (18)
xi  0 (19)
  0 (20)
i  0 (21)
xi[
1
p
 X
N
(ci   xi)p
! 1 p
p
:p: (ci   xi)p 1     i] = 0 (22)
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 
E  
X
N
xi
!
= 0 (23)
i (ci   xi) = 0 (24)
for all i 2 N
We have either  = 0 or E =
P
N xi and either i = 0 or ci = xi for all i 2 N .
Suppose we have ci = xi and i > 0 for some i 2 N . When xi = ci holds, we
have i =   since xi[1p (
P
N (ci   xi)p)
1 p
p :p: (ci   xi)p 1      i] = 0 must holds.
This constraint contradicts with the fact that   0 so this is not the case for any
i 2 N . This implies we have i = 0 for all i 2 N meaning that either xi = 0
or 1
p
(
P
N (ci   xi)p)
1 p
p :p: (ci   xi)p 1 =  holds for all i 2 N and either  = 0 or
E =
P
N xi holds .
Suppose we have  = 0 then ci = xi for all i 2 N and E =
P
N ci since
xi[
1
p
 X
N
(ci   xi)p
! 1 p
p
:p: (ci   xi)p 1     i] = 0 (25)
must holds.
Suppose  > 0, the we have either 1
p
(
P
N (ci   xi)p)
1 p
p :p: (ci   xi)p 1 =  for all
i 2 N implying that ci   xi =  for all i 2 N and E =
P
N xi or xi = 0 for some
i 2 f1; ::; kg and 1
p
(
P
N (cj   xj)p)
1 p
p :p: (cj   xj)p 1 =  for some j 2 fk + 1; :::; ng
where N = f1; ::; ng and E =Pj2fk+1;:::;ng xj.
Any solution x of the constrained maximization problem gives the constrained
equal losses rule solutions.
Any constrained equal losses rule solution selects an option x with following condi-
tions; either ci   xi =  for all i 2 N and E =
P
N xi if such an  exits or xi = 0 for
some i 2 f1; ::; kg and cj   xj =  for some j 2 fk + 1; :::; ng where N = f1; ::; ng and
E =
P
j2fk+1;:::;ng xj if such an  exists.
The proof shows that
EL (c; E) = arg min
x2X(c;E)
d (c;X (c; E))
for all (c; E) 2 C where
d =
 X
N
(ci   xi)p
! 1
p
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.Hence it corresponds to Yu solutions family with respect to parameter p > 1.
Under the construction of Aspiration Based Choice Model, we have a decision maker
that forms a single subjective distance function that is independent of the choice prob-
lem. We do not allow a metric that is a function of c meaning that the notion of
resemblance perceived by the decision maker does not change from simple allocation
problem to simple allocation problem. This constraint can be interpreted as a consis-
tency requirement in the model.
Remark 12 Aspiration Based Choice Model with a single continuous metric on sim-
ple allocation problems is not consistent with Proportional Rule. Consider the deci-
sion maker with subjective distance function d = max (i (ci   xi)) where i represent
the weight of ith person in the society such that
P
N i = 1. For an weight vec-
tor  2 RN+ there exists a suitable characteristic vector c such that PRO (c; E) =
argminx2X(c;E) (max (i (ci   xi))) for all simple allocation problems with (c; :) 2 C
but for a given c0 such that c0 6= c we have argminx2X(c0;E) (max (i (c0i   xi))) 6=
PRO (c0; E).
6 Conclusion
This thesis proposes a characterization for limited consideration and aspiration based
choice models on simple allocation problems.
Our rst model uses a constraint function generated from the characteristic vector
to narrow down the allocations which are available to choose instead of rationalizing
choice through a utility maximization procedure over choice set of a simple allocation
problem. This approach captures the inuence of the characteristic vector over the
choice of a decision maker via limited consideration. Theorem 3 states that any alloca-
tion rule can be rationalized by the Limited Consideration Choice Model. This theorem
shows that any choice behavior can be explained by limited consideration concept by
identifying the underlying attention set of a decision maker. Proposition 5 shows that
the consistency property over the constraint function is equivalent to contraction inde-
pendence axiom so that any allocation rule that is consistent with our model and has
a consistent constraint function is rational. This property characterizes the necessary
and su¢ cient requirement for a well behaved constraint function. Identifying a weaker
version a consistency property may be useful for analyzing di¤erent choice behaviors
departing from the properties of the constraint function. We next show that some well
20
known allocation rules that are consistent with our model have constraint functions
that satisfy equal treatment of equals property. Analyzing the constraint functions
that are consistent with di¤erent allocation rules and that satisfy equal treatment of
equals property may be interesting to see the ones that provide this desired property.
Proposition 9 provides an order over the limited consideration models with constraint
functions that are consistent with some well known allocations rules. Extending this
analysis over other limited consideration models remains as a study of this eld.
Our second model proposes a distance minimization procedure to capture the notion
of resemblance in the mind of the decision maker via subjective distance functions in
contrast to standard choice model with a utility maximization procedure. It provides
an analysis over the selection of an ideal point and a geometrical interpretation to
standard problems. Proposition 11 states that aspiration based choice model with P-
norm metrics where p > 1 gives the Constrained Equal Losses rule and corresponds
to Yu solution family with respect to parameter p > 1 from the bargaining literature.
Identifying di¤erent distance functions that accommodate to other allocation rules may
be useful to expand the scope of this study.
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